Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the “tragedy of the commons”
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Fig. 1
Group contributions to the public good dropped in the no reputation condition (–▴–), but rose in the regular reputation (–•–) and competitive reputation (–□–) conditions, showing that having an opportunity for reputation makes people more likely to contribute to public goods. Contributions were less likely to drop in the final round of the competitive reputation condition than in the regular reputation condition, suggesting that when individuals have to compete for the most altruistic reputation, they are more likely to continue being altruistic to the end. The error bars represent standard errors of the means.
Fig. 2
Average amount (and standard errors of the means) sent to each player in the trust game as a function of their rank as contributors in the PGG. (A) There were no significant differences in the no reputation condition. (B) In the regular reputation condition, the highest-ranking PGG contributors were entrusted with more money than the second lowest or lowest-ranking contributors, and the second highest contributors were entrusted with more than the lowest-ranking contributors. (C) In the competitive reputation condition, the lowest-ranking PGG contributor received less than the other three players did.
Fig. 2
Average amount (and standard errors of the means) sent to each player in the trust game as a function of their rank as contributors in the PGG. (A) There were no significant differences in the no reputation condition. (B) In the regular reputation condition, the highest-ranking PGG contributors were entrusted with more money than the second lowest or lowest-ranking contributors, and the second highest contributors were entrusted with more than the lowest-ranking contributors. (C) In the competitive reputation condition, the lowest-ranking PGG contributor received less than the other three players did.
Fig. 2
Average amount (and standard errors of the means) sent to each player in the trust game as a function of their rank as contributors in the PGG. (A) There were no significant differences in the no reputation condition. (B) In the regular reputation condition, the highest-ranking PGG contributors were entrusted with more money than the second lowest or lowest-ranking contributors, and the second highest contributors were entrusted with more than the lowest-ranking contributors. (C) In the competitive reputation condition, the lowest-ranking PGG contributor received less than the other three players did.
Abstract
The benefits of a good reputation can help explain why some individuals are willing to be altruistic in situations where they will not receive direct benefits. Recent experiments on indirect reciprocity have shown that when people stand to benefit from having a good reputation, they are more altruistic towards groups and charities. However, it is unknown whether indirect reciprocity is the only thing that can cause such an effect. Individuals may be altruistic because it will make them more trustworthy. In this study, I show that participants in a cooperative group game contribute more to their group when they expect to play a dyadic trust game afterwards, and that participants do tend to trust altruistic individuals more than nonaltruistic individuals. I also included a condition where participants had to choose only one person to trust (instead of being able to trust all players) in the dyadic trust game that followed the cooperative group game, and contributions towards the group were maintained best in this condition. This provides some evidence that competition for scarce reputational benefits can help maintain cooperative behaviour because of competitive altruism.
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☆This paper is based on the Young Investigator Award winning presentation at HBES2003
