Altruism toward in-group members as a reputation mechanism☆

Abstract 

To test the hypothesis that sensitivity to monitoring drives people to act altruistically toward members of their own community, two experiments investigated whether an eye-like painting promotes altruism toward in-group members, but not toward out-group members. Participants played the role of dictator in a dictator game with another participant (a recipient) who was from the minimal in-group or out-group. Participants knew whether their recipient was an in-group member or an out-group member, but were informed that their recipient did not know the group membership of the dictator. In-group favoritism occurred only when participants were facing a computer desktop which displayed a painting of eyes, but did not occur in the absence of eyes. These findings demonstrate that the eye painting displayed on the participant's computer screen worked as a cue for monitoring and thus enhanced the participant's altruistic behavior.

Keywords: Altruism, Cooperation, Reputation, Indirect reciprocity, Dictator game, In-group favoritism