Evolution & Human Behavior
Volume 24, Issue 3 , Pages 153-172 , May 2003

Explaining altruistic behavior in humans

  • Herbert Gintis

      Affiliations

    • Corresponding Author InformationCorresponding author. Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
    • Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
    • Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA
    • ,
  • Samuel Bowles

      Affiliations

    • Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
    • Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA
    • ,
  • Robert Boyd

      Affiliations

    • Department of Anthropology, University of California at Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Box 951361 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1361, USA
    • ,
  • Ernst Fehr

      Affiliations

    • University of Zürich, Blümlisalpstrae 10 CH-8006 Zürich, Switzerland

Received 15 February 2002 ,Revised 29 November 2002

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PII: S1090-5138(02)00157-5

doi: 10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00157-5

Evolution & Human Behavior
Volume 24, Issue 3 , Pages 153-172 , May 2003

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