Evolution & Human Behavior
Volume 24, Issue 3 , Pages 153-172, May 2003

Explaining altruistic behavior in humans

  • Herbert Gintis

      Affiliations

    • Corresponding Author InformationCorresponding author. Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
    • Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
    • Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA
    • ,
  • Samuel Bowles

      Affiliations

    • Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
    • Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA
    • ,
  • Robert Boyd

      Affiliations

    • Department of Anthropology, University of California at Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Box 951361 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1361, USA
    • ,
  • Ernst Fehr

      Affiliations

    • University of Zürich, Blümlisalpstrae 10 CH-8006 Zürich, Switzerland

Received 15 February 2002; received in revised form 29 November 2002

Abstract 

Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of self-regarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods.

Keywords: Altruism, Reciprocity, Experimental games, Evolution of cooperation

To access this article, please choose from the options below

Login to an existing account or Register a new account.

  • Purchase this article for 31.50 USD (You must login/register to purchase this article)

    Online access for 24 hours. The PDF version can be downloaded as your permanent record.

  • Subscribe to this title

    Get unlimited online access to this article and all other articles in this title 24/7 for one year.

  • Claim access now

    For current subscribers with Society Membership or Account Number.

  • Visit SciVerse ScienceDirect to see if you have access via your institution.
 

PII: S1090-5138(02)00157-5

doi:10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00157-5

Evolution & Human Behavior
Volume 24, Issue 3 , Pages 153-172, May 2003

Article Tools