The influence of postreliance detection on the deceptive efficacy of dishonest signals of intent:

Abstract 

Evolutionary communication theory posits that signalers and receivers are in a coevolutionary arms race. Receivers attempt to predict the behavior of signalers, and signalers attempt to manipulate the behavior of receivers (often through the use of dishonest signals of intent). This has led to the perception that deceitful signalers prefer perfectly deceptive signals. However, it is often easy for receivers to determine that a signal of intent was dishonest after relying on it to their detriment. Even the best deceivers may then acquire a reputation for being dishonest. For instance, in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)-like social situations, predictable defectors make better social partners than unpredictable defectors. When opportunities to engage in social interaction depend on one's reputation for predictability, those who are better at concealing their defecting intentions may suffer the most from the reputations they acquire. Deceivers then face a tradeoff between the short-term benefits of successful deception and the long-term costs to their reputations. A mathematical model is developed and it is shown that the tradeoff often favors signalers who produce imperfectly deceptive signals over perfectly honest or perfectly deceptive ones. Implications for understanding human facial expressions and sociopathy are drawn.

Keywords:  Cooperation, Deception, Defection, Dishonesty, Facial expressions, Honesty, Intent, Signal, Sociopathy